On Indoctrination at the University
(An essay by a graduate student)

Recently, a number of advocacy groups have arisen claiming that liberal professors at major universities are indoctrinating students with liberal beliefs rather than providing an objective, or at least balanced overview of their subject. At the heart of these claims lies two well-known truths about education: first, what is taught always has political ramifications; and second, what is taught is greatly influenced by the subjective preferences of the instructor. The problem is exacerbated because of the power imbalance between the professor and the student, who cannot be expected to successfully dispute what he or she is being taught in all but rare cases. For these reasons, it is difficult to establish criteria that ensure the professor will use his or her authority to teach rather than to indoctrinate. Nevertheless, the following observations can help to broadly define the boundaries of acceptable and unacceptable practices in specific situations.

First, political comments or politically-based content have no place in courses outside the humanities. Thus, the biology professor who inveighs against the war in Iraq, or the business professor who uses class time to argue against gay marriage engage in unacceptable behavior. Clearly, devoting substantial time in such classes to political discussion violates the criterion that the material taught is appropriate to the objectives of the course in question. Yet, must off-hand comments of a political nature be barred from such courses? It is a matter of professional behavior by those whose comments, even on matters unrelated to their academic expertise, are understood by students as authoritative. For this reason, the professor has a duty to respect the diversity of beliefs of his students, whether these beliefs are religious, social, or political. This creates a positive duty on the professor's part to refrain from comments that depreciate student beliefs on topics not relevant to the material being taught. However, this relationship between the professor and student also creates two positive duties on the student's part: first, to accept occasional disparaging comments with good grace; and second, when the number or offensiveness of these comments exceeds the threshold that a reasonable person should have to accept, to clearly and politely inform the professor that his behavior is unacceptable and must cease. In sum, professors should be careful not to offend, and students should not seek to be offended. Following this guideline will resolve most, if not all, student complaints about political indoctrination in courses outside the humanities.

Second, when understanding political content is a legitimate part of the course objectives, professors must represent as far as possible the current state of knowledge and evaluation on the subject matter in their respective field. Thus, when the discipline offers competing interpretations of an event, or competing theories of political and social processes, these must be presented to student as objectively as possible so that divided state of knowledge in the field is accurately represented. For example, it is unacceptable to present only a Marxist theory of social conflict provided that other theories are practiced in the discipline. In the same manner, it is unacceptable to present one interpretation of an event as correct when the multiple interpretations exist within the discipline. These injunctions do not mean that professors should not offer commentary drawn from their own experience regarding the relative merit of competing theories or interpretations. A Marxist professor may offer reasons for endorsing Marxism, provided that he also explains the weakness of the Marxist approach and represents competing theories in a fair manner. Furthermore, the professor is not obligated to present competing views when one view predominates throughout the discipline: just as biologists no longer teach spontaneous generation as a valid theory, professors in the social sciences and humanities do not need to generate conflict where none exists. Having said this, it is rare for a theory or interpretation in the social sciences to gain the widespread acceptance accorded to theories in the physical sciences. Fairly representing competing views entails stepping outside of one's epistemic circle and considering competing views in the discipline as a whole. Which views are disputed enough to warrant this type of presentation is of course a judgment call on the part of the professor. However, if professors seek to represent competing views in good faith, they will eliminate the majority of student grievances concerning indoctrination in the humanities and social sciences.

The two cases considered so far are relatively easy to resolve with the application of common sense, professionalism, and mutual respect. However, a much more difficult problem is presented when the foundational assumptions of a discipline as a whole imbue everything taught with a certain political perspective. For example, it is assumed in women's studies that patriarchy is the chief cause of societies' problems: this is an a priori assumption, and scholarship in women's studies seeks to elaborate its implications rather than prove its validity. Furthermore, professors in women's studies accept a priori that knowledge is entirely a social construction of the dominant elements in society; thus, they deny that one should (or even can) objectively present information, and as a consequence, their teachings are explicitly biased in favor of their political beliefs. This situation cannot be resolved by the principles we have suggested so far, because these suggestions assume the existence of an objective epistemic perspective that disciplines such as women's studies deny. Furthermore, because this denial of objectivity is foundational, it can only be countered by providing conclusive philosophical proof that epistemic objectivity is possible. This is beyond the scope of philosophy, which can delineate the consequences that stem from a given set of foundational beliefs, but rarely contest the validity of the beliefs themselves with the degree of finality necessary to convince a skeptical inquirer. Simply put, if disciplines such as women's studies wish to base their scholarship upon the belief that all knowledge is a social construction, there is little philosophical ground to oppose them, because such a view, while implausible in its pure form, cannot be conclusively refuted.

If this is the case, how are we to answer the student who claims that his instructor is indoctrinating him when the instructor denies the difference between education and indoctrination? We have no choice but to agree with him. Students in classes such as these are being indoctrinated, and they are right to resent it. However, recognizing this fact is far easier than effecting change within these disciplines. As outlined above, philosophy cannot conclusively refute the claim that knowledge is purely a social construction. The most it can do is point out the untenable nature of this claim in its purest form: radical subjectivity, like radical objectivity, is wrought with unresolvable contradictions, and for this reason is a poor model of truth. However, there exist many forms of subjectivism that are philosophically robust which professors can use to absolve themselves of wrongdoing. It is the duty of the professor, and the discipline as a whole, to decide upon the validity of an epistemic outlook after weighing the relevant claims with a disinterested eye.

This need for a disinterested outlook is what disciplines such as women's studies lack, and why the Academic Bill of Rights touted by conservative activist groups will not prevent indoctrination in their classrooms. This Bill of Rights is an institutional corrective, but the problem is not institutional: rather, the problem lies in the culture of academic scholarship, which has been corrupted by the dual desires of many academics to make their work relevant to contemporary society, and to achieve instant fixes for longstanding social and political inequalities. No institutional imperative can replace the disinterested judgment of the academic when it comes to endorsing a particular view of truth. Such a Bill of Rights, like Plato's injunction that poets only compose verses that inspire men to virtuous action, will achieve its only success in utterly destroying the enterprise it seeks to reform. Academic inquiry, like artistic creation, relies upon the careful and considered judgment of the inquirer. Historically, the cultural imperative to seek the truth at all costs has provided the vital support necessary to maintain this detached approach to knowledge production. The erosion of this culture, while not unique to contemporary academic times, is the root cause of contemporary academic problems. When professors decide that political influence is more important than the disinterested pursuit of truth, the academic enterprise is doomed.